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1. Introduction  
 
In the last two decades, a lot of Western countries have experienced massive immigration 
waves. Despite the growing relevance of this phenomenon in Europe, and the well-established 
(de)segregation literature in the U.S., studies investigating the peer interaction between native and 
non-native students in European schools are just a few. Although it is widely accepted that non-
native students typically face more problems at school and have lower scores in standardized tests, 
causes, consequences and possible policy implications are still unclear (OECD, 2010). Moreover, 
while there is a vast literature on the effects of immigration on native labour market outcomes, 
economic literature on the effects of non-native students on native peers‟ achievement is quite 
limited, and the specific question of whether non-native peers affect natives‟ educational outcomes 
has received relatively little attention and presents mixed evidence (Brunello and Rocco, 2011; 
Gould et al., 2009
2
). For instance, Jensen and Rasmussen (2008) find a negative effect of school 
ethnic concentration on cognitive outcomes for Danish native students
3
. Brunello and Rocco (2011) 
provide cross-country evidence of a negative but small effect of the share of immigrants on natives‟ 
educational attainment exploiting PISA data for a sample of 27 countries (mainly from Europe and 
the Anglo-Saxon world).  
This paper focuses on „social interactions‟4 among pupils of different ethnic origins 
attending the same class or the same school. In the existing literature social interactions among 
schoolmates are commonly referred to as „peer effects‟ or „peer-groups effects‟5. Peer influence in 
general, but also in the specific case of the interactions between native and non-native students, 
studied different outcomes such as achievement levels (as measured by test scores), teen pregnancy, 
delinquency, smoke and drug use, high school attrition and drop-outs, college choice (Hanushek et 
al., 2003), and it may have an effect in the accumulation and development of both cognitive and 
non-cognitive skills (Neidell and Waldfogel, 2010). Indeed, there is not clear evidence on possible 
consequences of social interactions between natives and non-natives in educational settings, and it 
                                                 
2
 Gould et al. (2009), “[...] the effect of immigration on the local labour market has received considerable attention in 
the literature, but little is known about the impact of immigration on the school system”.  
3
 Evidence on school composition and immigrant lower test scores for Denmark and Switzerland is also provided by 
Schindler (2007) and Meunier (2010), respectively.  
4
 We define „social interactions‟ all forms of interdependencies among individuals in which preferences, beliefs and 
constraints faced by one socioeconomic actor are directly influenced by the characteristics and choices of others 
(Durlauf and Ioannides, 2009). Peer group influence is a particular form of social interaction. It refers to 
contemporaneous, and usually reciprocal, behavioural influences within a reference group so that the propensity of an 
agent to behave in some way varies positively with the prevalence of this behaviour in the group (Durlauf, 2004, and 
Manski, 2000). These interactions usually produce the well documented empirical regularity that “[...] agents belonging 
to the same group tend to behave similarly” (Manski, 2000). 
5
 This terms usually indicates social interactions of children or young adults with people of similar age, in order to make 
a distinction from the broader „neighbourhood effects‟ stemming from interactions with superiors, family or teachers 
(Gibbons and Telhaj, 2006). 
2
  
might happen that such interactions (if they exist) could tend either to increase or decrease the 
existing attainment gaps. On top of that, even less is known on the possible underlying mechanisms 
that such peer interactions may follow (De Giorgi and Pellizzari, 2011).  
The aim of the paper is twofold. On the one hand, we propose a theoretical framework to 
stylize the possible mechanisms of peer interactions that could lead to an „integration‟ or a 
„rejection‟ of non-native peers, depending on the degree of isolation experienced by non-native 
students in each school. On the other hand, we test the theoretical predictions identifying the causal 
link between non-natives‟ school concentration and the educational outcomes of native students6. 
Which kind of social mechanism may work in peer interaction between native and non-native 
students? Do different levels of non-native school share have different impacts on natives‟ 
attainments? We use as outcome measure attainment levels proxied by standardized test scores 
exploiting a unique dataset combining INVALSI First Cycle Exams (test scores of all 8
th
 grade 
students enrolled in Italian junior high schools
7
) with census and administrative records on schools 
characteristics and socio-economic environment. 
The theoretical framework is based on Lazear (2001) model of education production and on 
the „subculture model‟ proposed by sociological literature in the U.S. (Fordham and Ogbu, 1986). 
The basic intuition is the following. Non-native and native students are characterized by different 
levels of propensity to „disrupt‟: non-native students are more disruptive because they typically 
need more help from teachers. Thus, in mixed schools, the presence of non-native students tends to 
have a negative impact on natives‟ attainment levels. However, if non-native students are relatively 
isolated, peer interactions with natives may be helpful for them so that their propensity to disrupt 
decreases, and so does their negative impact on natives‟ attainments. Disruption is mitigated 
through an „integration mechanism‟ that can be at work only for sufficiently low levels of non-
native school concentration. On the other hand, if non-native students are enough to create some 
„critical mass‟ (i.e. they are not isolated), they tend to cluster and do not interact with native, so that 
they continue to be, on average, more disruptive and thus cause negative impacts on natives‟ 
attainment. This „rejection mechanism‟ may be due to different reasons, for instance, natives may 
be willing to make sufficient effort to include a few minority members but unwilling to make the 
effort to include numerous non-native schoolmates. 
                                                 
6
 Data from Italian Ministry of Education generally only distinguish between Italian and non-Italian students, thus 
referring to a pure citizenship criterion. In the reminder of the paper we define to as „non-native‟ student an individual 
enrolled in the Italian school system and having both parents without Italian citizenship. This definition coincides with 
the definition of the Italian Ministry of Education Statistical Service (MIUR 2009a) of „non-Italian students‟.  Notice 
that if a student has one of the parents who is Italian, he automatically gains the Italian citizenship (because of the ius 
sanguinis rule) and so he is defined as „native student‟ independently from the country of birth. 
7
 8
th
 grade students, i.e. students finishing their third year of the Italian middle grade comprehensive school. The Italian 
„Junior High School Diploma‟ corresponds to ISCED level 2. 
3
  
From the empirical point of view, solving serious problems of sorting and omitted variables 
bias is crucial in the correct identification of the effect. Our identification strategy is based on 
school-level averages in order to sidestep the non-random allocation of non-native students across 
classes and school fixed effects, and exploits the within school idiosyncratic variation in non-native 
share between adjacent cohorts (Hoxby, 2000; Gould et al. 2009; Brunello and Rocco, 2011).  
This paper contributes to the existing literature in a number of ways. It provides additional 
evidence on peer effects between native and non-native students in the Italian junior-high schools 
contexts. It overcomes problem of under-representation of immigrant shares typical of survey data 
exploiting a rich administrative dataset containing information on all 8
th
 grade students enrolled in 
Italian junior high schools. Finally, it links the empirical evidence to the theoretical framework of 
peer interaction based on „integration‟ and „rejection‟ mechanisms to shed light on the interpretation 
of the results. Our results show that non-native school share has small and negative impacts on 
Language test scores of natives‟ peers, while it does not significantly affect Math test scores. The 
stylized predictions of the theoretical framework are confirmed in the analysis of heterogeneous and 
non-linear effects. In particular, heterogeneous effects show that the negative effects to natives‟ 
attainment are concentrated only in schools characterized by low levels of non-natives‟ isolation 
(or, alternatively, high exposure), while they are not statistically different from zero when isolation 
is high. Non-linearity analysis shows that non-natives‟ school share below 10% for Language, and 
20% for Math, does not significantly affect natives‟ attainment. To give a numerical intuition for 
these results, we calculate that, on average, a non-native school share of 10% corresponds to 9 non-
native students in the school or, equivalently, 1 or 2 non-native students in each class. Below these 
critical mass average values, the „integration‟ mechanism is at work, and non-native students are 
assimilated with native peers. The opposite is true for the „rejection mechanism‟, which is working 
above the critical mass value found. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents a review of the literature; 
Section 3 explains the theoretical framework, Section 4 describes the econometric model and 
identification strategy designed to test the stylized predictions of the theoretical framework; Section 
6 discusses the main characteristics of the dataset and provides general descriptive evidence; 
Section 5 and Section 6 discuss the results and conduct sensitivity checks. Section 7 concludes and 
provides some policy implications. 
 
 
 
 
4
  
2. Literature 
 
The empirical analysis of the effects of non-native students‟ on native peers educational 
outcomes stems from the „desegregation‟ literature8, which examines the effect of minority students 
on the achievements of the other students in the U.S. schools (Gould, Lavy and Paserman, 2009). 
Early desegregation literature proposes a variety of analyses on the relationship between ethnic 
origins and achievement (among the others: Armor, 1995; Cook, 1984; Crain et al. 1978), but does 
not consider social interactions between native and non-native students as a potential educational 
input to explain the persistent attainment gap. The first study mentioning the contribution that the 
class and school ethnic composition has on the individual achievement is the „Coleman Report‟ 
(Coleman, 1966)
9
. Starting from Coleman (1966), scholars in the sociology of education have long 
argued that, apart from students‟ ability and background, peers influence is an important 
determinant of students‟ achievement (Kramarz et al., 2008). Economic literature on peer effects 
among native and non-native students only appears in the Nineties, while interest on the economic 
analysis of social interactions was flourishing. Although the great variety of studies on social 
interactions in educational outcomes, empirical evidence and theoretical models on peer effects 
between native and immigrant students still presents mixed findings and just a few analysis on 
possible channels and mechanisms at work (Sacerdote, 2010).  
Empirical literature in the U.S. traditionally focused on achievement gaps between black (or 
other minority students) and white students, and only in the last decade peer interaction has started 
to be seen as one of the possible causes of many observed different behaviours between white and 
black students (Heckman, 2011). Early contributions were given by Evans, Oates and Schwab 
(1992) and Cutler and Glaeser (1997), while Hoxby (2000), Hanushek et al. (2009) and Hanushek 
and Rivkin (2009) are the first to define „racial peer effects‟ as a particular group of social 
interactions taking place between students belonging to different ethnic groups. Hoxby (2000) 
exploits idiosyncratic variation in the racial and gender composition of adjacent cohorts within the 
same grade and within the same school to estimate the effects of exposure to minority school share 
on achievement of white and minority students. Her results show that immigrant school share has 
                                                 
8
 For decades economists and sociologists studied the effects of desegregation plans imposed by U.S. Courts, starting 
from Brown vs. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). The ruling in Brown v. Board of Education (1954) held that 
„separate but equal‟, while not inherently unconstitutional in all areas, was unconstitutional in the case of education 
because separate education for blacks and whites could not be equal. This ruling led to dramatic changes in schools 
throughout the country (Hanushek et al., 2009). 
9
 “[...] those inputs characteristics of schools that are most alike for Negroes and whites have least effect on their 
achievement. The magnitudes of differences between schools attended by Negroes and those attended by whites were as 
follows: least, facilities and curriculum; next, teacher quality; and greatest, educational backgrounds of fellow students. 
The order of importance of these inputs on the achievement of Negro students is precisely the same: facilities and 
curriculum least, teacher quality next, and backgrounds of fellow students, most”, Coleman (1966). 
5
  
weak effects on students‟ achievement, but these effects are generally higher among students of the 
same ethnic group than among students belonging to different ethnic groups. Hanushek et al. (2009) 
and Hanushek and Rivkin (2009) base the estimation strategy on individual fixed effects retrieved 
tracking the same students and cohorts over time: the estimation of peer group effects relies 
therefore on cohort differences in the changes in racial composition as students‟ progress through 
school. They find that black students test scores are strongly decreasing in the black school share: 
their estimates imply that excess exposure of black students to black grade mates causes the black-
white test score gap to grow by 0.07 standard deviations with each year in school, but no effects on 
white students.  
The general result that „intra-race group‟ peer effects are stronger compared to „extra-race 
group‟ effects is also found by Angrist and Lang (2004) who exploit the quasi-natural variation in 
the fraction of minority students provided by one of the most important desegregation plan 
implemented in Boston school districts (i.e. the Metco program), moving low-achievers black 
students to preeminently white schools in the rich Boston suburbs. A new strand of literature 
interprets this general result under the light of the „acting-white‟ theory that says that black students 
may underachieve in order to fit with their peers‟ behaviour. Fryer and Torelli (2010) provide the 
first empirical evidence using the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health (AddHealth) 
and estimating the effects on achievement of an „index of social status‟ based on the individuals‟ 
contacts with same-race friends within the school. They show that this „acting white‟ proxy variable 
varies a lot with respect to school characteristics and individual achievement. The effect is 
concentrated in schools with more interracial contact: their coefficient for „acting-white‟ variable is 
twice as large in schools that are above the median in terms of segregation, whereas is significantly 
lower where black students are more isolated.  
 Outside the U.S., empirical evidence is still quite limited and generally points to a negative 
effects of non-native school shares on native students attainments. In order to identify the causal 
link of the immigrant concentration on the outcomes of natives, Gould et al. (2009) exploit the 
variation in the number of immigrants in 5
th
 grade conditional on the total number of immigrant 
students in grades 4 to 6. IV results point to a strong adverse effect of immigrant concentration on 
native outcomes, but the estimates are not statistically different from the OLS coefficients. Their 
approach is interesting and new under two main aspects: first, they use a quasi-experimental 
evidence claiming that early ‟90 immigration waves in Israeli can be considered as an exogenous 
variation in immigrants‟ flows; second, they focus on long-term outcomes (rather than 
contemporaneous peers‟ outcomes effects). Jensen and Rasmussen (2008) analyse the effect of 
ethnic concentration in schools on the cognitive outcomes of children. They use a rich dataset for 
6
  
Danish ninth-grade students, based on PISA test scores matched with administrative and census 
information. In order to correct for the endogeneity in school ethnic concentration authors apply 
school fixed-effects and IV, using as instrumental variable the ethnic concentration in a larger 
geographical area where school is located. Results show that there is a negative effect of ethnic 
concentration on students‟ outcomes, and that this is significant only for the native Danish children. 
Brunello and Rocco (2011) study whether a higher share of immigrant pupils affects the school 
performance of natives using aggregate multi-country data from PISA, and find a negative but small 
effect. The analysis is conducted exploiting aggregation at the country level to avoid sorting 
problems of immigrant students within each country, while fixed effects and country socio-
economic indicators are used to solve the problem of across country sorting and time trends in 
immigrants residential choices. They also find evidence that, conditional on the average share of 
immigrant pupils, a reduction of the dispersion of this share between schools would have small 
positive effects on the test scores of natives. Finally, Maestri (2011) investigates how the 
heterogeneity of the ethnic minority composition within schools affects natives‟ and non-natives‟ 
attainment. She exploits the within school cohort-to-cohort variation in ethnic diversity of a rich 
dataset about primary education in the Netherlands and finds that ethnic diversity has a positive 
impact on the test scores of minority students, in particular for language skills. She also finds some 
evidence of a negative relationship between ethnic diversity index and a measure of school social 
interactions among pupils. 
 
3. Theoretical framework 
 
The theoretical framework combines Lazear (2001) „bad apple model‟ for the education 
production process and the „subcultural‟ model of interaction between white and blacks students 
proposed in the sociological literature (Fordham and Ogbu, 1986; Steele and Aronson, 1998). On 
the one hand, the „bad apple model‟ is based on the driving idea that peer effects are important 
determinants of all educational processes in the classroom and proposes the „disruption mechanism‟ 
as one of the possible explanation of peer pressure in educational settings. On the other hand, the 
subculture model identifies the „integration vs. rejection mechanism‟ as a possible explanation of 
the „social mechanisms‟ causing the black-white gaps in attainments levels. From a general 
perspective, in the „subculture model‟ the native student (majority type) remains supportive of non-
native students (minority type) as long as the latter is relatively isolated (Hoxby and Weinghart, 
2006). When, however, minority students become prevalent enough to form a critical mass, the 
7
  
majority type rejects them. The „subculture‟ model can also explain the evidence of „acting-white‟ 
behaviours found in U.S. schools (Austen-Smith and Fryer, 2005; Fryer and Torelli, 2010). 
 
3.1 The disruption model with native and non-native students 
Following Lazear (2001), define p as the probability that any student is not hurting his own 
learning or other‟s learning at any moment in the time spent at school, and (1 – p) as the probability 
that any given student initiates a „disruption‟. Given a class size of n, the probability that disruption 
occurs at any moment in time t is (1 – pn). Define V as the value of a unit of learning, which is 
influenced by the likelihood that a student is not engaged in a disruptive behaviour in the given 
instant t, and Z the total number of student in the school. Then, total output for each school (Y) and 
per student output (y) are given by: 
Y=ZVp
n
 
y=Vp
n
 
Disruption can actually follow many channels. It could be thought as students‟ need of help 
causing the teacher to slow the activity of the class, as well as students‟ propensity to 
disturb/interrupt or even to make questions to the teachers. The basic assumption made is that one 
child‟s disruption hurts the learning process in that moment of all students (including the disruptive 
one). Therefore, disruption is a possible mechanism of peer interaction that directly influences the 
learning process and the attainment levels through externalities caused by peers‟ behaviour10. Non-
native students are lower achieving students (on average, as shown by descriptive statistics), and 
usually need more help and attention from teachers. Moreover, non-native students are always less 
numerous with respect to native peers. Therefore, we assume that non-native students (j=NN) 
causes more disruption (on average) with respect to native peers (j=N), and define as (1-θ) the 
proportion of native students in each school. Then, we can identify to types of students (j=N, NN) 
with different values of pj: pN ≥ pNN.  
Lazear (2001) demonstrates that total output is maximized when students are segregated by 
type. To see this, suppose without loss of generality that V=1 and consider the output per student 
assuming class size equals n, the optimum class size with mixed classes. Per student output in 
mixed (ymix) and perfectly segregated schools (yseg) will be equal to: 
(1 )n n
mix N NNy p p
   
 (1 )
n n
seg N NNy p p     
                                                 
10
 De Giorgi and Pellizzari (2011), Epple and Romano (2011) and Sacerdote (2010) point to the Lazear (2011) model as 
one of the potential model of peer interaction in the classroom, as well as Hoxby and Weinghart (2006) include the „Bad 
Apple model‟ and the „subculture model‟ in their analysis of possible model of peer interaction in the classroom.  
8
  
Then: 
( ) 0
N NN
seg mix p p
y y

   
1
( )
(1 ) 1 0
N NN
n
seg mix n NN
N
N Np p
y y p
np
p p

 

    
     
    
 
Which implies that segregation induces a higher per student output with class size optimal for 
mixed classes whenever  pN > pNN. Letting class size be optimal when schools or classes are 
segregated reinforces the results (Lazear 2001, Epple and Romano 2011). 
 
3.2 The integration-rejection model of peer interaction 
Segregation leads to the maximum output if only if pN > pNN. Peer interactions could 
intervene to reduce non-natives disruption probability (1 – pNN) as far as native students‟ behaviour 
could exert positive spillovers on non-natives through an „integration mechanism‟. Native students‟ 
behaviour (i.e. less disruptive types‟ behaviour) could have a positive impact on non-native peers 
and, as a consequence of the integration process, pNN → pN. Integration, however, has some cost 
which we assume to be the effort made by native students to integrate non-native peers. Intuitively, 
if non-native students are relatively isolated, then the integration mechanism is less costly for native 
students, whereas anytime non-native students become prevalent enough to form a critical mass, the 
native type rejects them because the effort of integration becomes too high
11
. Conversely, whenever 
non-native students are relatively more isolated, they are somehow „forced‟ to interact with native 
peers. Therefore, pNN  depends on the integration effort made by native students (e) which, in turn, is 
an increasing function of the proportion of non-native students, θ. Without loss of generality, we set 
to zero the effort cost in the case θ is lower than a certain critical value ( ) and positive otherwise, 
and assume that native students do not exert integration effort unless it is zero (or, close enough to 
zero). Formally: 
0 if 
( )
0 if 
e
 

 
 
 
 
   
                                                 
11
 The basic intuition for this formalization of the „integration‟ vs. „rejection‟ mechanism based on non-natives relative 
isolation is already present in Lazear (2001) model: “[…] It is necessary that B‟s can be transformed into A‟s by being 
around them. If this effect is strong enough, then integrated classes are efficient. For example, if B‟s were immediately 
transformed into A‟s when integrated with them, and if this imposed no cost on A‟s, then efficiency would be enhanced 
by mixing B‟s with A‟s. As a practical matter, transformation of B‟s into A‟s is most likely to occur when the ratio of 
A‟s to B‟s is large. If a school of 100 had 99 B‟s and 1 A, it is unlikely that the one A student would change the behavior 
of all of the other B students”, p. 791, original enphasis. The same intuition can be also found in the „cultural 
assimilation model‟ by Lazear (1999). 
9
  
 if 
 if 
N
NN
N
p
p
p
 
 
 
 
 
 
The formalization of the integration mechanism makes per student output depend on θ: if 
  , the integration mechanism prevails, N NNp p  and ( ) 0seg mixy y  ; if    the rejection 
mechanism prevails because integration is too costly and less likely to take place, therefore the 
previous results for mixed classes hold. Actually, the rejection may be due to different reasons: 
natives may be willing to make sufficient effort to include a few minority members but unwilling to 
make the effort to include numerous non-native schoolmates and but also unwilling to include some 
non-native students while rejecting others (Hoxby and Weingarth, 2005). 
Focusing on the effects on non-native students, and given that (perfect) segregation cannot be 
observed in our data, if θ is sufficiently high, then the rejection mechanism is at work and 
disruption in a mixed class leads to lower levels of per student output for natives. On the other hand, 
if θ is sufficiently low, then the integration mechanism is at work, and per student natives‟ output is 
not hurt by non-natives disruption. We can stylize the predictions of the model in the following 
way: 
i) 0 if N
y
 


 

 → the rejection mechanism prevails 
ii) 0 if N
y
 


 

→ the integration mechanism prevails 
4. Empirical strategy 
 
As widely recognized in the literature, the vast majority of cross-sectional variation in 
students‟ peers is generated by selection: students self-select into schools based on their family 
background and income, parents‟ job locations, residential preferences, school rules, educational 
preferences and even ability (Hoxby, 2000). In the specific case of the estimation of peer effects 
between native and non-native students, first of all, one must account for the endogenous placement 
of immigrants into some geographical areas that are usually more likely to be populated also by 
lower-achieving native students, regardless of the local level of immigrant concentration (Gould et 
al., 2009). As a consequence, non-natives‟ concentration in the schools may be endogenous because 
of parents‟ housing decisions: individuals sort into neighbourhoods because they want - or do not 
want, or they are forced - to live in a „ghetto‟ area, or in areas where an occupation is more likely to 
be found, or in areas where renting houses is less expensive, and so on. Second, the peer group can 
be the result of individual choices: for example, given the residential choice of the household, 
10
  
individuals living in a given area choose a certain school on the basis of some (perceived) school 
quality. Third, given the school choice, the allocation of non-native students among the classes 
within a certain school is usually not random. Ammermueller and Pischke (2009) provide evidence 
of the non-random assignment of non-natives students within school and within classes in some 
European country. Finally, it is worthy to underline that non-random allocation of non-native 
students is not only the results of endogenous individual choice, but also depends on school staff, 
municipalities choices and law regulation
12
. Besides self-selection issues, the estimation of a 
reduced form model retrieving the peer effect parameters is also hard because of the problems 
arising from the presence of the correlated effects that will give rise to a bias if they are correlated 
with peer group composition (Manski, 1993).  
 
4.1 Baseline empirical model 
The sorting processes described and the difficulty to control for all possible correlated 
effects may lead to a negative spurious correlation between attainments levels of native students and 
non-native school share, independently from the fact that non-native students actually cause some 
bad or good externalities on natives‟ (Brunello and Rocco, 2011). Our estimation strategy relies on 
the basic assumption that changes in non-natives school shares between subsequent cohorts within 
the same school are not correlated with pupils‟ unobservable characteristics that may be relevant in 
the educational production process. We solve sorting of non-native students across classes within 
the same school using school level averages and we identify the effect of non-native school share on 
natives‟ attainment by exploiting school by time variations in the data, using the following 
empirical specification: 
N NN N N
st st st s t sty P X            [1] 
where N
sty  represents the school mean test score of all 8
th
 grade native (j=N) students in 
school s and year t, NN
stP  
is non-native school share in school s and year t, N
stX  is a vector 
containing mean characteristics of native students in school s and year t,  φs are school fixed-effects 
and the term φt includes time and territorial fixed-effects
13
. A nice feature of this specification is 
that it can be easily reconducted to a  reduced-form linear-in-means model for peer effects 
estimation (Card and Rothstein, 2009) where both endogenous and exogenous effects arising from 
exposure to non-native peers are incorporated in β (Manski, 1993). However, we cannot distinguish 
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 In Italy, Heads, School Boards and Municipalities must collaborate to allocate non-Italian students within schools and 
within classes in such a way to avoid segregation problems. 
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 Territorial fixed-effects include five territorial dummies (North West, North East, Centre, South, Islands) interacted 
with year dummies for the three Invalsi IC waves. 
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whether β reflects the exogenous effects of student‟s peers characteristics or the endogenous effects 
operating through student‟s peers achievement (i.e. the well-known „Reflection Problem‟). Anyway, 
finding evidence of the „social effects‟ (i.e. both endogenous and exogenous) is still of substantial 
policy interest (Ammermüller and Pischke, 2009; Hoxby, 2000) and still hard in practice because of 
endogenous sorting, selection issues and omitted variables bias (Hanushek et al. 2003). 
Conducting our analysis at the school level solves the sorting of non-natives across classes 
in the same school, while school fixed effects solve possible omitted variable bias in individual 
mean characteristics and school mean characteristics which may influence native attainments (i.e. 
the correlated effects). The important issue that must be addressed in our empirical model is across 
schools sorting of non-native students. Indeed, school fixed-effects and geographical area fixed 
effects should already capture this sorting. However, we exploit the original features of our dataset 
and add to the specification in eq. [1] a set of school by year variables (Wst) which capture the 
socio-economic characteristics of each school catchment-area. The socio-economic variables are 
chosen in order to select characteristics of the catchment-area that could have attracted immigrant 
families in the past, and thus influence the actual non-native school shares. For example, we include 
male and female occupation rate, population density, indicators for poor housing conditions. We 
also include the number of non-Italian residents in each school catchment area in 2001 (i.e. at the 
beginning of the sharp increase in the Italian immigration trend) which can be shown to be a strong 
predictor of the actual non-natives school shares and thus control for non-natives‟ sorting across 
schools.  
A final concern may arise if we observe that even the variation of non-natives shares across 
subsequent school years can be endogenous because of some sort of „native flight‟ or underlying 
time trends (Betts and Fairlie 2003, Hoxby 2000 among others). To solve this issue we apply the 
same strategy used by Gould et al. (2009) and Brunello and Rocco (2011) conditioning on the total 
stock of non-native students in the school and on the total school size (Sst). Therefore, conditioning 
on these variables, the share of non-native students who are attending the 8
th
 grade in each school 
can be considered as good as random, while any residual correlation between non-native shares and 
school characteristics is captured by the school fixed-effects. Thus, we estimate the following 
equation: 
N NN N N
st st st st st s t sty P X W S                [2] 
Table 4 contains the complete list and description of the variables included in the Xst, Wst 
and Sst vectors. 
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4.2 Heterogeneous and non-linear and effects 
The estimation of  in eq. [2] allows a causal interpretation of the effect of non-native 
school share on natives‟ attainment which we interpret as non-natives‟ peer effects on natives‟ 
attainment. However, to test the predictions of the theoretical model it is necessary to introduce 
heterogeneity and/or non-linearity in the estimation of the parameter of interest.  
We allow for heterogeneity in the effects dividing the sample according to different levels of 
the „isolation‟ experienced by non-natives: the more they are isolated the less costly is for natives to 
integrate them. In particular, we calculate the exposure index (E
j
N/NN) as a measure of the exposure 
of native students to non-native students in each school district j (i.e. province): the higher is the 
exposure of native students to non-native peers, the lower is the isolation of non-natives and the 
higher is the effort cost for assimilation. The exposure index takes the following form: 
1
/
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j
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where Nij represents the sum of native students in school i of school district j, and similarly 
NNij represents the sum of non-native students in school i of school district j; Kj is the total number 
of junior high school in school-district j. This measure is a refinement of the simple non-native 
school share and is generally interpreted as the percentage of non-native students enrolled with the 
average native student (Clotfelter, 1999; Freyer, 2011). Then, we create a dummy variable (ds) 
taking value 1 if a school is located in a school district characterized by a low level of non-natives‟ 
isolation (i.e. an exposure index above the median). Heterogeneous effects are estimated splitting 
the whole schools population into subsamples according to ds: 
 
1 1 1 1
2 2 2 2
    if 0
   if 1
N NN N N
st st st st st s t st s
N NN N N
st st st st st s t st s
y P X W S d
y P X W S d
      
      
        

       
      [3]
 
 
The specification of Equation [2] also allows testing the basic results of the theoretical 
framework presented in Section 3 introducing non-linearity in an easy and flexible way. In fact, the 
theoretical framework predicts that the effects of non-native shares are non-linear, but rather vary 
with respect to different levels of NNstP . We introduce a linear spline functional form in the non-
native school share dividing the percentage range [0; 1] into two intervals with boundaries ,   and
 , where   and  correspond, respectively, to 0 and 1.  
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1 2
1 2
where:
          if 0
1      if 1
N N N
st st st st st st s t st
st sti
st
st st
y P P X W S
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       
  
  
       
  
 
  
   [4] 
 
Equations [3] and [4] can be used to test the predictions of the theoretical framework, testing 
that 1≥0 and 2<0. More precisely: 
i) 11If 0 when  or 0 
N
s
st
y
d
P
  

    

 the „integration mechanism‟ prevails 
ii) 22If 0 when  or 1 
N
s
st
y
d
P
  

    

 the „rejection mechanism‟ prevails 
 
5. Data and descriptive statistics 
 
Data requirements to estimate peer effects differ a lot according to the identification 
strategy. One generally needs information on students, students‟ family background and 
schoolmates, school characteristics and environment. Using cross-sectional datasets, the definition 
of the peer group is crucial. If data allows to define an individual specific peer group (for example, 
using individual specific friends network information), then it is conceptually possible to overcome 
the „reflection problem‟ and estimate separately endogenous and exogenous peer effects (Bramoullé 
et al. 2009, and De Giorgi et al. 2010). On the other hand, if the peer group is exogenously defined 
as the school or classmates group, a separate identification of the two effects is usually not possible, 
and researchers generally estimate a reduced form model aimed at disentangling the peer effects 
(endogenous and exogenous) from the correlated effects (Gibbons and Telhaj, 2006; Ammermueller 
and Pischke, 2009, among others). In addition, as outlined above, in the specific case of the 
estimation of „ethnic peer effects‟ data from sample surveys may suffer from underrepresentation of 
the immigrants population and errors in immigrant shares measures can lead to substantially 
underestimate the effects of non-native school share on test scores (Aydemir and Borjas, 2010).  
We exploit a unique dataset that combines the Invalsi First Cycle Final Exam data
14
, 
administrative records from Ministry of Education Statistical Office, and the Italian Population 
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Census Survey 2001
15
. Invalsi First Cycle Exam (from now on „First Cycle‟ or „Invalsi IC‟) data are 
the first experience of testing attainment levels of all students enrolled in Italian junior high schools. 
The census dimension of Invalsi IC tests allows us to overcome problems of underrepresentation of 
immigrant individuals and measurement errors in sample surveys. Additional information about 
socio-economic family background are obtained as school-level averages of Census variables linked 
to each school using an original matching technique that identifies for each junior high school its 
„catchment area‟. To our knowledge, this is the first time that a dataset with such a variety of 
information and covering the universe of 8
th
 graders students is made available for the Italian school 
system.  
In detail, Invalsi IC dataset contains school level information, Math and Language test 
scores results and individual information for each 8
th
 grade student enrolled in a public or private 
Italian junior high school
16
. Three waves are available, corresponding to 2007-08, 2008-09 and 
2009-10 school years final exams (about 500,000 students per wave). Individual information covers 
year of birth, gender, citizenship (Italian, non-Italian), place of birth; how long the student is in Italy 
if born abroad (from primary school, for 1-3 years, less than 1 year); mother‟s and father‟s place of 
birth (Italy, EU, European but non-EU, other non-European country), grade retention (if the student 
is „regular‟ i.e. if he/she is 14 years old at the end of the school year; „in advance‟ i.e. younger than 
„regular‟ students, or „retained‟ i.e. older than „regular‟ students), school and class identifier. 
Administrative records from Ministry of Education Statistical Office provide general information 
about school characteristics (i.e. type of school, public vs. private, number of students enrolled and 
number of teachers, average class size) matched to Invalsi First Cycle data through an anonymous 
school identifier. Finally, Census 2001 contains information about resident population in Italy in 
2001. Each school is matched to a group of census divisions through an original matching technique 
designed to associate to each junior high school a group of census cells constituting its „catchment 
area‟ (Barbieri, Rossetti and Sestito, 2010)17. This procedure allows matching to each junior high 
school more than two hundreds variables from 2001 Italian Population Census Survey covering a 
great variety of demographic and socio-economic information on resident population (gender, age, 
ethnic origins, education, labour force participation, occupation, households‟ composition and 
houses characteristics).  
 
5.1 Descriptive statistics  
                                                 
15
 Many people collaborate to make available the dataset used. We thank: Claudio Rossetti (Luiss), Patrizia Falzetti 
(Invalsi) and Marco Mignani (Invalsi) for their work in merging Census and Miur data with the Invalsi IC datasets; 
Paolo Sestito (Bank of Italy), Piero Cipollone (Invalsi and Bank of Italy) for fruitful discussions and data support. 
16
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We exploit the panel dimension of the dataset constituted by 5771 junior high schools
18
 
(s=1…5771) and three school years (t=2008, 2009, 2010). Mean test scores and mean individual 
characteristics are obtained from all 8
th
 grade students enrolled in all Italian junior high schools
19
 in 
2007-08, 2008-09 and 2009-10 (1,504,286 individuals), while school characteristics are matched 
from Census and administrative school records as explained above. 
Table 1 describes general characteristics of the junior high schools in the dataset (percentage 
of public schools, non-native school share, average school size, average class size) with respect to 
macro-area and Invalsi IC wave, while Figure 2 shows the average percentage of non-native 
students per school (i.e. „school shares‟). The distribution of non-native students across Italian 
territory is highly not homogenous: Northern and Centre regions experience the highest average 
school share of non-native students (10.01% and 9.18% in 2010), while it dramatically falls in the 
South (1.97%), while school characteristics, such as average school and class size are generally 
equally distributed. Table 2 shows school average and standard deviation of test scores results 
according to the native/non-native partition of each school population: gaps between mean test 
scores for natives and non-natives are large and statistically significant. Descriptive evidence 
confirms general results common in the European literature: first, non-native students perform 
worse than their native peers; second, gaps are greater in Language and lower for Math. The 
distribution of school mean test scores is also different: non-native students‟ test score distribution 
is more similar to a normal distribution, and shows a higher variance.  
We focus on the test score gap between native and non-native students at the individual level 
in Table 3 where we report the coefficient of the dummy variable „being non-native‟ obtained 
running descriptive (pooled) OLS regressions on the whole sample of IC 2009 and 2010 students. 
We first show the row coefficient, i.e. the unconditioned attainment gap: non-native students have 
test score results lower than native peers by 21.21% in Language, and 15.08% in Math. Then, we 
progressively add controls for individual characteristics (gender, retention, parents‟ origins, time 
spent in the host country since birth), school characteristics (ownership, type, size, average class 
size, pupil-teacher ratio, support teacher-pupil ratio) and territorial dummies
20
. The conditioned 
gaps turn out to be smaller than the unconditioned one, but still significantly different from zero: 
coeteris paribus, being non-native implies a 7% lower test score in Language and 4% in Math.  
Apart from the sharp differences in non-native students school shares across regions and 
areas, two main results may be drawn from these general descriptive evidence. First, there exists a 
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sizable gap in test scores results between native and non-native students, and this attainment gap 
seems to be more critical in Language rather than in Math skills. Second, even after taking into 
account individual characteristics, parental background, school characteristics and territorial 
differences, the attainment gap is reduced but still persists. Therefore, descriptive evidence supports 
the basic assumption of the theoretical framework: coeteris paribus, non-native students may cause 
more disruption in the classroom compared to native peers (pNN>pN) because of lower attainments 
levels and poorer language skills. Moreover, given that the gap does not disappear controlling for 
usual school and family background inputs, it is plausible to think that „social‟ inputs and peers‟ 
externalities may play a crucial role in explaining these gaps (Akerlof and Kranton 2000, 2002; 
Zenou and Patacchini 2006; Heckman 2011; Freyer 2011, among others).  
 
 
6. Results 
 
In this section, we first present the baseline model results and then we test for heterogeneous 
and non-linear effects in order to find evidence to support or reject the theoretical model we propose 
in Section 3. As already outlined, the variable of interest is the non-native school share ( NN
stP ) and 
the parameter  captures both the exogenous effects operating through student‟s peers 
characteristics and the (pure) endogenous effects operating through students‟ peers achievement.  
 
6.1 Baseline model results 
Table 5 contains the results for the estimation of the parameter of interest from eq. [1] and 
[2]. The dependent variable is the log of the Invalsi IC school mean test score for native students, 
and we conduct our analysis separating the Language from the Math test score. The rationale for 
doing it being that we expect peer effects to have greater impact on Language tests as long as 
language skills are directly influenced by the use of Italian language with native peers in the 
classroom. We progressively add school variables controls (Sst) in columns (II), and catchment-area 
socio economic variables (Wst) in columns (III)
21
. Thus, the coefficients estimated in columns (I) 
correspond to eq. [1], while the ones estimated in columns (III) to eq. [2]. Adding school and 
catchment-area controls significantly influences the estimates, improving the school fixed-effects 
basic framework and limiting the possible biases due to across school sorting. In fact, focusing on 
the estimates of  from eq. [2] (columns III) we have small and negative effects, statistically 
different from zero only for Language test score. Thus, increasing non-native school share by 1% 
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determines a decrease of 6.5% in native peers‟ Language test score, and no significant effects in 
Math. 
These results are in line with the limited evidence from European literature on peer effects 
between immigrants and native students (see Brunello and Rocco, 2011), and with evidence from 
U.S. (Angrist and Lang, 2004; Hoxby, 2000; Hanushek and Rivkin, 2009). However, to test the 
implications of the theoretical framework proposed, we have to allow for heterogeneous effects and 
non-linear effects in non-natives school share.  
 
6.2 Non-linear and heterogeneous effects: which underlying mechanism is at work? 
To sum up the basic intuition of the theoretical model, if the integration process is at work, 
or worked throughout the whole school year, there is not difference in the disruption attitudes 
between the two types (pNN → pN), thus non-native share should not have negative and significant 
impacts on natives‟ attainment. On the contrary, if integration mechanisms is not at work, non-
native and native students tend to isolate themselves into separate peer groups and the disruption 
parameter of non-native students would not converge to the one of native peers (pNN > pN) and, 
consequently, natives attainment will be hurt by non-natives. The transition from the „integration‟ to 
the „rejection‟ mechanism is driven by the isolation of non-native students. Integration is more 
likely to happen when non-native students are relatively more isolated, and therefore it is not (or, at 
least, less) costly for native peers integrate them. In order to retrieve the estimates of 1 and 2, 
heterogeneous effects split the whole school population into two groups according to different 
levels of isolation experienced by non-native students (ds=1 low isolation; ds=0 high isolation), 
while non-linear effects seek for structural break into the distribution of the non-native school share 
variable, so that the estimated parameters are different below and above a given threshold ( ). 
Thus, equations [3] and [4] can be both consistently used to test: 
i) 11 0
N
st
y
P


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
→ the integration mechanism prevails 
ii) 22 0
N
st
y
P


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
 → the rejection mechanism prevails 
Heterogeneous effects 
Following the definition provided in §4.2 we split the sample according to a high (above the 
median) and low (below the median) level of the exposure index. Exposure is commonly used as a 
measure of isolation: a high exposure of non-native to native peers implies a low isolation, and vice 
versa (Freyer, 2011). Table 6 shows the results from the estimation of eq. [3]: the effects on natives‟ 
attainment due to non-native peers are negative and significant only in schools characterized by 
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high levels of exposure (2<0), while they are not statistically different from zero when exposure is 
low (1=0). Interestingly, we find negative effects both in Math and Language, contrary to the non-
heterogeneous baseline model. Therefore, these results support the theoretical predictions: when 
non-natives are more isolated the integration process is working, while when isolation is reduced 
non-natives‟ school share determines negative effects on natives‟ attainment (increasing of 1% the 
non-native school share, determines a decrease in natives‟ test scores by 8% in Language and 7% in 
Math). In the sensitivity analysis we test the robustness of these results using different measures of 
isolation to split the sample, showing that results do not depend on the particular measure chosen. 
Non-linear effects 
We test for non-linarites in the effects of non-native school share on natives‟ test scores 
estimating 1 and 2 using a spline linear function with one break point (T= ), eq. [4]. To seek for 
structural changes in the effect we use different values of the break and report the results in Table 7. 
This allows to show in a flexible way how effects are different above and below any given 
threshold, and if they are statistically significant. First, we notice that effects are highly non-linear 
(we always reject the null that 1 - 2 = 0). For instance, setting the threshold at the mean of the 
non-native school share distribution (T=0.065) we have that increasing by 1% the non-native share 
has not significant effects if the non-native school share is below 6.5% (T), while it decreases 
natives‟ language test scores by 7.6% if the share is above 6.5%. Thus, both in Language and Math, 
the general pattern of the results confirms that the increase of non-native share has negative and 
significant effects only for sufficiently large values of  . To be more precise, we cannot reject the 
null that 1=0 and 2<0 for T<0.20, while if T>0.20 1 and 2 are both negative and significant for 
Language test.  
We go deeper into the analysis introducing a spline function with two break points, where 
the first one is fixed at 10% (T1=0.10) and we set different values for the second (T2). The rationale 
is the following: with one break point we exclude that the structural break ( ) is greater than the 
threshold of 10%, indeed the effects above 10% are still unclear. Table 8 shows the results for three 
possible break points for T2=0.20; 0.25; 0.30
22
. Results for Math test score do not show clear 
patterns, while for Language we always find negative and significant effects between 10% and 20, 
25 and 30% levels of non-native school share.  
Summing up and putting together the results from Table 7 and Table 8, we have that non-
linear effects are stronger for Language test score, while less clear for Math. In details: for the 
Language test, we cannot reject the null that 1=0 and 2<0 for  < 0.10, while for Math the same 
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result holds for  < 0.20. To give a numerical intuition, we calculate that, on average, a non-native 
school share of 10% corresponds to 9 non-native students in the school, or, equivalently, 1 or 2 non-
natives students in each class. If in each class there are one or two non-native students, the 
„integration‟ process works and their presence do not significantly affect natives‟ attainment. 
Interestingly, this result is stronger for language skills. 
 
7. Sensitivity analysis 
 
We test the robustness of our results under three dimensions. First, we test the robustness 
with respect to missing values in school and catchment-area variables due to the dataset 
construction. Then we test for possible concerns due to the main source of endogeneity (across 
school sorting). Finally we try different specifications of the „isolation measure‟ used for the 
estimation of eq. [3]. 
 
7.1 Missing values in school and catchment-area variables 
Missing values in school and catchment-area variable are due to the construction of the 
dataset. This fact causes the number of schools in the regression estimates to shrink from 6,289 in 
the estimation of eq. [1] to 4827 in the estimation of eq. [2] (Table 5). We test the robustness of the 
baseline results controlling for missing values and correcting missing values with some 
approximations, where possible, to verify that the results are not driven by any kind of sample 
selection. Indeed, a preliminary analysis with OLS regressions excludes any particular pattern of 
missing values due to geographical school location. 
The variable containing the information about the „stock of non-native students‟ in the 
school is missing for 16% of schools due to school register data missing. We correct this variable in 
two possible ways: (i) setting missing values to zero and creating an indicator variable taking value 
1 when this information was corrected; (ii) we replace the missing values with the total stock of 8
th
 
graders non-natives students in the three available school years. Catchment-area variables are 
missing because the matching procedure between the school identifier and the census cells failed 
due to some non-perfect overlapping between the school identifier in the Invalsi data and the one in 
the Census data. However, for more than half of them we can replace the missing values of the 
socio-economic variables of the school catchment-area with the average value of the same variables 
taken from the schools which are located in the same municipality. This correction procedure 
shrinks missing data on catchment-area variables from 6.3% to 4.6% of schools. Table 9 shows that 
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implementing the correction procedures allows keeping all the observations but does not modify 
previous results, which, in turn, are not due to some selection pattern in the missing data. 
 
7.2 Possible concerns from across school sorting 
The identification strategy implemented by eq. [2] is designed to control for across school 
sorting through school fixed-effects, territorial by year fixed effects and school specific catchment-
area socio economic variables. To test that the identification strategy is suitable to capture this main 
source of endogeneity, we split the sample of schools into two groups according to school location 
in big or small municipalities. We define to as „big municipalities‟ those having three or more 
junior high schools in their territory, while „small municipalities‟ have one or two junior high 
schools. The enrolment rules are based on residency criteria, therefore students have to attend the 
junior high school in the same municipality where they live with their family. If there is more than 
one school, then families usually have to enrol the child to the school of the area where they reside, 
otherwise they are allowed to enrol the child to another junior high school of the municipality, if 
free slots are available.  
Thus, the enrolment institutional framework limits per se across school sorting, however this 
is still possible and more likely to happen in big municipalities, where there is a sufficiently large 
number of junior high schools and families have some degree of „choice‟. Moreover, „big 
municipalities‟ are the ones located in more urbanized areas, which benefit from higher public 
transportation means that could favour, to some extent, the commuting process from the residency 
place to a distant junior high school, alternative to the one nearby home. Thus, we run separately eq. 
[2] on the subsample of small and big municipalities. If across school sorting is at work, the 
estimations should differ substantially in the two groups of schools inducing a negative spurious 
correlation between natives‟ mean test scores and non-native shares, and downward bias in the 
estimation of . Given that across school sorting is more likely to happen in urban areas (i.e. big 
municipalities group), concerns for across school sorting would then arise if we systematically find 
that 
_ _big municip small municip  . Estimations in Table 10 reject this hypothesis: effects are similar in 
the two subsamples, though slightly larger, in absolute terms, in small municipalities.  
An additional sensitivity check was carried out using instead of the five areas territorial 
dummies (North East, North West, Centre, South, Islands), 103 territorial dummies corresponding 
to junior-high school districts (which also correspond to Italian Provinces, NUT5). School districts 
by year fixed-effects and school fixed-effects would capture any kind of across-school sorting 
within each school district. Table 11 shows that the effects do not change with respect to the 
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baseline specification. Thus we can conclude that across schools sorting is adequately captured in 
our empirical model. 
 
7.3 Alternative ‘isolation measure’ 
We build an alternative measure of isolation to show that the heterogeneity in the effects is 
not driven by the use of the exposure index. Following Lazear (2001) we define an isolation index 
as the ratio between non-native and native students, i.e. the ratio between the numbers of the two 
types in each school. Thus, we build the isolation index (Is) as the ratio between non-native students 
in school s (as the sum of non-native students in each class of the school s, Cs) and native students: 
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Is gets larger for lower levels of isolation. Thus, we estimate eq. [3] defining ds=1 if the 
school has an isolation index below the median, and, vice-versa, ds=0 if the school has an isolation 
index above the median. Table 12 confirm robustness of previous results based on the exposure 
index. Focusing on Language, 1 is non-significantly different from zero (though higher with 
respect to the analysis with the exposure index) and 2<0. Both the effects are non-statistically 
different from zero for Math test. The main intuition of the model seems to be confirmed especially 
in Language skills. 
 
8. Conclusions 
 
This paper shed light on peer interaction between native and non-native students 
contributing to the existing literature in three main aspects. First, we provide a theoretical 
framework to interpret possible underlying social mechanisms that work through peer interactions; 
second, we estimate the effect of non-native school share on natives‟ attainments identifying the 
social interaction parameter (); third, allowing for heterogeneous and non-linear effects, we 
provide empirical evidence to support the stylized predictions of the theoretical framework. 
The estimation results are of substantial interest per se, given the limited evidence in 
European setting of peer effects between natives and immigrants, and given the growing relevance 
of the immigration phenomenon and its impacts, not only on the labour markets, but also on the 
school system. Increasing non-native school share by 1% determines a decrease of 6.5% in native 
peers‟ Language test score, and no significant effects in Math. These results are in line with the 
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limited evidence from European literature on peer effects between immigrants and native students 
(see Brunello and Rocco, 2011), and with evidence from U.S. (Angrist and Lang, 2004; Hoxby, 
2000; Hanushek and Rivkin, 2009; Sacerdote, 2010) which finds limited evidence of negative 
„between-groups‟ effects. Moreover, the empirical analysis confirms the theoretical framework 
proposed and points to „isolation‟ of non-native students as a possible transition device that 
determines whether „integration‟ or „rejection‟ mechanism is at work.  
The negative effects are concentrated in schools where non-native students experience 
limited isolation to non-native peers and are highly non-linear with respect to non-native school 
share. We calculate that if in each class there are one or two non-native students (or, equivalently, 
the non-native share is below 10%), the „integration‟ process works and their presence do not 
significantly affect natives‟ attainment. Interestingly, all the results are stronger for Language test 
scores, confirming that language skills are more influenced by peer interaction between native and 
non-natives, rather than Mathematical competences. Indeed, more research has to be undertaken to 
study peer effects within the peer group of non-natives students, to understand to which extent their 
concentration in the school or in the class could harm themselves and induce their clustering. 
Our work also suggests important policy implications concerning allocation rules of non-
native students across classes and across schools. The driving idea of any allocation rule should be 
to avoid any concentration on non-native students in the same class or school, and rather to 
distribute them equally. In general, our results show that a relative isolation of non-native students 
from other non-native peers is beneficial for natives as it forces the integration mechanism between 
the two peer groups. A non-native school share below 10% in each school would ensure this 
mechanism to be at work. For instance, a recent regulation act from the Italian Ministry of 
Education imposes a cap threshold of 30% to non-native share in each class
23
. According to our 
findings, this threshold would be inefficiently high and may not have any effect to the educational 
production in the classroom.  
                                                 
23
 “Indicazioni e raccomandazioni per l’integrazione di alunni con cittadinanza non italiana”, MIUR, Circolare 
Ministeriale No. 2/2010 (C.M. 8/1/2010, n. 2). 
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Figures  
 
Figure 1. Non-native students percentage in the Italian school system, from s.y. 1996-07 to 2008-09. 
 
Source: own elaboration on MIUR (2009) data.  
 
Figure 2. Average percentage of non-native student per school (i.e. „school share‟) by macro-area and school year 
(Invalsi IC data). 
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Tables 
 
Table 1. School level descriptive statistics. 
Wave 
Invalsi IC 
Area 
No. 
Students 
No. 
Schools 
% Public 
Schools 
% Non-
native 
students 
Avg. No. 
Students per 
School 
Avg. No. 
Students per 
Class 
% Schools linked 
to Catchment 
Area Info. 
2007-08 
North 201,650 2313 83.48 9.49 295.32 21.08 95.72 
Centre 89,870 998 85.77 8.07 301.62 20.68 94.99 
South 204,339 2388 95.27 1.48 287.48 19.36 93.34 
Tot. 495,859 5699 88.82 5.95 293.11 20.28 94.59 
2008-09 
North 211,567 2359 83.59 11.20 341.94 21.20 94.82 
Centre 93,440 1017 86.52 8.97 342.03 20.83 94.00 
South 205,856 2427 95.09 1.83 298.58 19.75 93.08 
Tot. 510,863 5803 88.91 7.04 322.21 20.48 93.95 
2009-10 
North 206,530 2368 83.78 11.24 306.61 21.30 93.12 
Centre 91,629 1009 86.72 9.28 315.50 21.00 92.86 
South 199,405 2356 95.33 1.84 291.01 20.08 91.85 
Tot. 497,564 5733 89.04 7.12 301.72 20.74 92.55 
 
 
Table 2. Mean and standard deviation of Invalsi IC average school test scores for native and non-native students. 
  MEAN  
  Language  Math  
Wave Invalsi IC Natives  Non-natives Delta Natives  Non-natives Delta 
2007-08 68.73 59.44 9.29*** 54.15 47.65 6.50*** 
2008-09 67.01 53.39 13.62*** 66.11 56.28 9.83*** 
2009-10 65.24 55.80 9.44*** 55.74 49.82 5.92*** 
  SD  
  Language  Math  
Wave Invalsi IC Natives  Non-natives Ratio Natives  Non-natives Ratio 
2007-08 6.36 11.77 0.54*** 8.79 12.55 0.70*** 
2008-09 8.22 15.01 0.55*** 9.43 15.51 0.61*** 
2009-10 7.05 11.11 0.63*** 8.16 11.07 0.74*** 
Notes. Test scores range from 0 to 100 (percentage of right answers). Delta indicates the difference between test score 
means of (native – non-native); *** indicates whether Delta>0 (ttest, p.val≤0.001); Ratio indicates the ratio between test 
score sd of (native / non-native); *** indicates whether Ratio<1 (p.val≤0.001). 
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Table 3. Gap in individual test scores between native and non-native students (Invalsi IC 2009-2010). 
  Non-native students attainment gap (Pooled OLS) 
                          Italian Language test score 
Non-native (dummy)  -0.2121***  -0.0685***  -0.0773***  -0.0716*** 
                          (0.0025)    (0.0039)    (0.0039)    (0.0038)    
                          Math test score 
Non-native (dummy)  -0.1508***  -0.0455***  -0.0483***  -0.0405*** 
                          (0.0025)    (0.0047)    (0.0042)    (0.0040)    
Clusters 6215 6190 5513 5513 
N 994593 852099 794896 794896 
Controls: 
  
    
Year Dummies X X X X 
Individual Characteristics   X X X 
School Characteristics     X X 
Province FE       X 
(Robust Std. Errors in parenthesis, Clustered at the School level). Significance level: * 
p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Notes. Coefficients are obtained from the dummy variable „being non-native‟ through pooled OLS regressions 
performed at the individual level. For detailed description of control variables included in the individual and school 
characteristics see Appendix B, Table B.1. Province fixed-effects (Province FE) include 103 territorial dummies. 
 
Table 4. Control variables used, description and source. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Type Name Description Source 
Individual (X) 
female Fraction of group j females in school s 
Invalsi / 
MIUR  
late 
Fraction of group j retained students 
in school s 
father place of birth 
Fraction of group j  students in school 
s with father born abroad  
always_italy 
Fraction of group j students in school 
s in Italy since birth 
mother place of birth 
Fraction of group j  students in school 
s with mother born abroad 
School (S) 
nonnatives_stock 
Total number of non native students in 
the school 
School_size 
School size, given by the total number 
of students in the school  
High_cheating_dummy  
(subject specific) 
Dummy equal 1 if the school is in the 
9
th
 decile of the school cheating 
coefficient distribution 
Catchment Area 
(W) 
 
lpop Log of total resident population 
Census 
2001 
illiterate Fraction of illiterate pop. 
university_edu 
Fraction of pop. with university level 
education 
m_occup_rate Male occupation rate 
f_occup_rate Female occupation rate 
foreign_citizens No. of non-Italian residents 
agri_oc 
Fraction of workers occupied in 
agriculture 
self_empl Fraction workers self-employed 
commuter 
Fraction of resident commuting every 
day for school or working reasons 
avg_family_members Average number of family members 
house_poor Fraction of houses without clean water 
house_new Fraction of houses built after 1980 
avg_rooms Average number of rooms per house 
26
  
Table 5. Baseline model results with school fixed-effects. 
   Dep. Var.: School Mean Log Score for NATIVE students 
                          Language Math 
 (I) (II) (III) (I) (II) (III) 
Non-native SS   -0.0867***  -0.0584**   -0.0653**   -0.0866**   -0.0428     -0.0499    
                          (0.0230)    (0.0249)    (0.0253)    (0.0345)    (0.0336)    (0.0344)    
R sq.    0.172       0.289       0.302       0.462       0.587       0.589    
Adj.R sq.    0.171       0.288       0.300       0.461       0.587       0.587    
Clusters 6289 5115 4827 6290 5115 4827 
N 17198 14368 13851 17199 14368 13851 
Controls             
Individual Charact. (X), school 
and year FE 
X X X X X X 
School variables   X X   X X 
Catchment Area*Year FE     X     X 
(Robust Std. Errors in parenthesis, Clustered at the School level). Sig. level: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
 
 
Table 6. Heterogeneous effects: high vs. low exposure. 
  Dep. Var.: School Mean Log Score for NATIVE students 
                          Language Math 
 
High 
Exposure 
(2) 
Low 
Exposure  
(1) 
High 
Exposure 
(2) 
Low 
Exposure 
(1)  
Non-native SS  -0.0810***  -0.0703     -0.0710**   -0.0440    
                          (0.0253)    (0.0763)    (0.0361)    (0.0941)    
R sq.    0.109       0.368       0.646       0.581    
Adj.R sq.    0.103       0.364       0.643       0.579    
Clusters 2514 2959 2514 2959 
N 6303 7136 6303 7136 
All Controls X X X X 
(Robust Std. Errors in parenthesis, Clustered at the School level). Sig. level: * p<0.1, 
** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table 7. Non-linear effects: spline linear functions with one structural break (T) 
  Dep. Var.: School Mean Log Score for NATIVE students 
                          Language 
 
T=0.04 T=0.065 T=0.10 T=0.20 T=0.25 
 
(med) (mean) (P75) (P95) (>P95) 
Share < T (1)  -0.0648     -0.0239     -0.0185     -0.0469*    -0.0478*   
 
(0.1080)    (0.0686)    (0.0452)    (0.0278)    (0.0259)    
Share > T (2)  -0.0628**   -0.0764**   -0.0954**   -0.1199*    -0.1615*   
                          (0.0291)    (0.0319)    (0.0379)    (0.0728)    (0.0949)    
R sq.    0.300       0.300       0.300       0.300       0.300    
Adj.R sq.    0.298       0.298       0.298       0.298       0.298    
Clusters 4825 4825 4825 4825 4825 
N 13576 13576 13576 13576 13576 
                          Math 
 
T=0.04 T=0.065 T=0.10 T=0.20 T=0.25 
 
(med) (mean) (P75) (P95) (>P95) 
Share < T (1)  -0.0844     -0.0047      0.0234     -0.0078     -0.0147    
 
(0.1448)    (0.0939)    (0.0620)    (0.0381)    (0.0350)    
Share > T (2)  -0.0405     -0.0612     -0.0977*    -0.1840*    -0.2536*   
                          (0.0397)    (0.0440)    (0.0528)    (0.1084)    (0.1417)    
R sq.    0.589       0.589       0.589       0.589       0.589    
Adj.R sq.    0.588       0.588       0.588       0.588       0.588    
Clusters 4825 4825 4825 4825 4825 
N 13576 13576 13576 13576 13576 
All Controls X   X X X 
(Robust Std. Errors in parenthesis, Clustered at the School level). Significance 
level: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Table 8. Non-linear effects: spline linear functions with two break points (T1=0.10 and T2=0.2, 0.25, 0.3). 
  Dep. Var.: School Mean Log Score for NATIVE students 
                          Language Math 
 
T1=0.10 T1=0.10 T1=0.10 T1=0.10 T1=0.10 T1=0.10 
 
T2=0.20 T2=0.25 T2=0.30 T2=0.20 T2=0.25 T2=0.30 
Share < T1 
(1) 
 -0.0215     -0.0241     -0.0249      0.0087      0.0095      0.0136    
 
(0.0465)    (0.0459)    (0.0456)    (0.0630)    (0.0624)    (0.0622)    
T1<Share<T2 
(2) 
 -0.0820*    -0.0723*    -0.0697*    -0.0304     -0.0397     -0.0577    
 
(0.0471)    (0.0397)    (0.0388)    (0.0639)    (0.0528)    (0.0514)    
Share > T2  -0.1114     -0.1544     -0.2133*    -0.1785     -0.2463*    -0.2812    
                          (0.0741)    (0.0952)    (0.1222)    (0.1104)    (0.1418)    (0.1785)    
R sq.    0.300       0.300       0.301       0.589       0.589       0.589    
Adj.R sq.    0.298       0.298       0.298       0.588       0.588       0.588    
Clusters 4825 4825 4825 4825 4825 4825 
N 13576 13576 13576 13576 13576 13576 
All Controls X   X   X X 
(Robust Std. Errors in parenthesis, Clustered at the School level). Significance level: * 
p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table 9. Sensitivity analysis to missing variables. 
  Dep. Var.: School Mean Log Score for NATIVE students 
                          Language 
 (I) (II) (III) (IV) 
Non-native SS   -0.0639**   -0.0616**   -0.0718***  -0.0732*** 
 
(0.0253)    (0.0250)    (0.0237)    (0.0229)    
R sq.    0.302       0.300       0.276       0.272    
Adj.R sq.    0.299       0.298       0.274       0.270    
Clusters 4827 4992 5557 6150 
N 13855 14142 16114 16919 
                          Math 
 (I) (II) (III) (IV) 
Non-native SS   -0.0512     -0.0450     -0.0534     -0.0581*   
 
(0.0344)    (0.0340)    (0.0329)    (0.0330)    
R sq.    0.589       0.589       0.573       0.574    
Adj.R sq.    0.587       0.588       0.571       0.573    
Clusters 4827 4992 5557 6151 
N 13855 14142 16114 16920 
All Controls X X X X 
Catchment Area Missing Correction   X   X 
School Variable Missing Correction     X X 
(Robust Std. Errors in parenthesis, Clustered at the School level). Sig. level: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
 
Table 10. Sensitivity analysis: big vs. small municipalities. 
  Dep. Var.: School Mean Log Score for NATIVE students 
                          Language 
 
Big 
Municipalities 
Small 
Municipalities 
Big 
Municipalities 
Small 
Municipalities 
Non-native SS  -0.0561*    -0.0808     -0.0559**   -0.0983**  
                          (0.0288)    (0.0522)    (0.0281)    (0.0403)    
R sq.    0.305       0.316       0.301       0.242    
Adj.R sq.    0.302       0.306       0.298       0.236    
Clusters 3757 1070 3949 2201 
N 10873 2984 11342 5577 
                          Math 
 
Big 
Municipalities 
Small 
Municipalities 
Big 
Municipalities 
Small 
Municipalities 
Non-native SS  -0.0386     -0.0938     -0.0344     -0.1049    
                          (0.0375)    (0.0796)    (0.0366)    (0.0656)    
R sq.    0.595       0.579       0.596       0.538    
Adj.R sq.    0.593       0.572       0.594       0.534    
Clusters 3757 1070 3949 2202 
N 10873 2984 11342 5578 
All Controls X X X X 
Corrected 
Missing 
    X X 
(Robust Std. Errors in parenthesis, Clustered at the School level). Significance level: * 
p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table 11. Sensitivity analysis: school district fixed-effects (province * Year). 
 
Dep. Var.: School Mean Log Score for 
NATIVE students 
 
Language Math 
Non-native SS -0.0492* -0.0636*** -0.0410 -0.0533 
 
(0.0252) (0.0228) (0.0344) (0.0332) 
R sq. 0.340 0.311 0.604 0.588 
Adj.R sq. 0.328 0.301 0.597 0.582 
Clusters 4827 6150 4827 6151 
N 13857 16917 13857 16918 
All Controls X X X X 
Province * Year 
FE 
X X X X 
Corrected Missing 
 
X 
 
X 
(Robust Std. Errors in parenthesis, Clustered at the School level). 
Significance level: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 12. Sensitivity analysis on heterogeneous effects: isolation index. 
  Dep. Var.: School Mean Log Score for NATIVE students 
                          Language Math 
 
Low Isolation 
(2) 
High Isolation 
(1) 
Low Isolation 
(2) 
High Isolation 
(1) 
Non-native SS  -0.0606**   -0.2543     -0.0444     -0.2735    
                          (0.0282)    (0.1769)    (0.0422)    (0.2261)    
R sq.    0.159       0.371       0.608       0.597    
Adj.R sq.    0.154       0.367       0.606       0.594    
Clusters 3167 2888 3167 2888 
N 7366 6488 7366 6488 
All Controls X X X X 
(Robust Std. Errors in parenthesis, Clustered at the School level). Sig. level: * 
p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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